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Abstract

This Article clarifies a doctrinal issue that has remained open to debate by both
legal scholars and lower courts since the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in
Lawrence v. Texas—namely, whether the Court repudiated morality as a
legitimate state interest for lawmaking—by approaching that opinion as a poetic
conflict or dialectic between two aesthetic modes, the line and unbounded space
or transcendence. Unlike conventional legal analysis, which focuses on what
the text of an opinion explicitly says—what it holds and how it gets there—an
interpretive strategy that approaches Lawrence in poetic terms and that pays
close attention to the stylistic interplay of competing (and conflicting)
metaphors and tropes reveals what is implicit in the opinion—the persistence of
moral line drawing—and what has otherwise been overlooked by commentators
and lower courts alike. This Article contends that, while Lawrence casts doubt
on the line that Bowers v. Hardwick drew specifically and on morality’s linedrawing more generally, it, too, draws a line between conduct and status that is
unstable and susceptible to critique. Although the Court criticizes its
predecessor for drawing an unprincipled, arbitrary, and ultimately untenable
distinction between normative and non-normative sexuality, the line that it
draws in Lawrence is no less so—particularly given the extent to which samesex conduct continues to be used after Lawrence to deny access to marriage, just
as it was before that case, as well as the extent to which the status of marriage
itself might be viewed as a form of private conduct.
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Morality, like art, means drawing a line someplace.
Oscar Wilde
Art, like morality, consists in drawing the line somewhere.
Gilbert K. Chesterton
Whether or not Lawrence v. Texas2 represents a truly radical break
with the past that it repudiates—Bowers v. Hardwick3—has been an issue of
considerable debate among legal scholars since the decision came down in
2003. Whereas some commentators maintain that the Lawrence majority
went too far, others contend that it likely did not go far enough.4 This
Article aligns itself with neither position exclusively, but rather offers an
interpretation of Lawrence as a text that repeats history even as it presses to
supersede it. On one level, the Lawrence Court attempts to move beyond
Bowersand the quintessential “act of lin e-drawing”5 which that case has
2

539 U.S. 558 (2003).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
4
See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2004) (arguing that “in Lawrence the Court relies on a
narrow version of liberty that is both geographized and domesticated—not a robust
conception of sexual freedom or liberty, as is commonly assumed”); Mary Anne Case, Of
“This” and “That” in Lawrence v. Texas, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 75 (2003) (“Now the Court
has taken gay rights a step—perhaps a giant step—forward. But, though Lawrence and
Garner prevailed, it remains to be seen how far into the public sphere and out of the now
protected confines of their individual homes the Lawrence case, and the Court, will take
them and others”); Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence
v. Texas, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2002-2003 21, 43 (James L. Swanson ed.,
2003) (“If the Court is serious in its ruling, Justice Scalia is right to contend that the shift
from privacy to liberty, and away from the New Deal-induced tension between the
presumption of constitutionality and fundamental rights, ‘will have far-reaching
implications beyond [Lawrence]’”); Nelson Lund and John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v.
Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555 (2004).
5
Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 747 (1989) (“the Court in
Hardwick necessarily drew a line: the right to privacy stops here. That act of line-drawing
was a quintessentially normative judgment. Unless and until the Court repudiates the
3

3

come to represent. If the Bowers majority embraced an aesthetic of linedrawing when establishing a boundary between normative and nonnormative sexuality, then the Lawrence majority offers a new aesthetic of
space, transcendence, and the movement beyond boundaries. On another
level, however, traces of Bowers’ aesthetic appear in the opinion when the
majority engages in its own act of boundary creation by drawing a line
between private intimate conduct and public marital status. Indeed, where
Lawrence criticizes its predecessor for drawing a line that cannot hold, the
oppositional logic that Lawrence itself adopts is vulnerable to the same
criticism.
One way to view Lawrence, and its engagement with the past that it
attempts to move beyond, is as a literary text—a poem—that stages a
conflict between the aesthetics of line and unmediated space and between
the temporal dimensions that those aesthetics signify, history and
modernity.6 In an essay written more than twenty years ago, James Boyd

privacy doctrine altogether, which it did not do in Hardwick, a decision to draw the line
here is nothing more than a judgment that this particular activity is either less fundamental
or more unsavory than the activities protected in prior cases”); see also Matthew Coles,
Lawrence v. Texas and the Refinement of Substantive Due Process, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 23, 44 (2005) (“But unlike the rest of modern substantive due process cases, Bowers
did draw a line and say that a right fundamental to some Americans was unavailable to
others”); Christopher J. Keller, Divining the Priest: A Case Comment on Baehr v. Lewin,
12 LAW AND INEQUALITY: A JOURNAL OF THEORY AND PRACTICE 483, 506-07 (1994)
(“The majority in Bowers arbitrarily drew the line of personal privacy at the boundary of
intimate homosexual relations and, in a manner unprecedented in a privacy case, narrowly
limited previous privacy rules to their specific facts”).
6
That is, whereas we might think about the “line” as demarcating points along a temporal
continuum—e.g., a line of cases, an historical timeline—we might think about “unbounded
space” in the sense that Pierre Schlag describes the energy aesthetic in the law, which
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White invited the legal community to think seriously about the connections
between these two seemingly dichotomous acts of interpretation: reading a
judicial opinion and reading a poem.7

Just as the poem constitutes a

privileged form of literary language in the canon of literature, so, too, does
the case constitute an “archetypal occasion for speech” and “the judicial
opinion deciding the case . . . [an] archetypal form” in the canon of law.8 If
we think about Lawrence as one such poem in the Supreme Court’s vast
“lyric” canon, then one of its organizational leitmotifs is this dialectic
between line and unmediated space, that is, the dialectic between the
institution of limits and the movement beyond them that uniformly
structures the majority opinion—and, not surprisingly, that constitutes the
basis for Justice Scalia’s dissent.

The first paragraph of the majority

opinion alone, notable for its rhetorical flourishes, stages a number of
moments where liberty, or unbounded space, conflicts with governmental

“leaves the stasis of the grid behind” and where “[l]aw is pictured as an arrow pointed to
the future.” Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047,
1050 (2002). In other words, the transcendence of history, or the line, signals an attempt to
claim a new moment in time.
7
James Boyd White, The Judicial Opinion and the Poem: Ways of Reading, Ways of Life,
82 MICH. L. REV. 1669 (1984), reprinted in JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERCULES’ BOW:
ESSAYS IN THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985). For criticisms of the
poem/opinion comparison, see Gerald Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and its Denial in Legal
Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545, 1564 (1990) (stating that “[n]o one will be surprised to
hear that judicial decisions are different from lyric poems . . . If the purpose of a judicial
decision is to close what has been open, the motive behind literature is likely to be the
desire to open what has been closed”); Richard Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation
Reargued, 72 VA. L. REV. 1351 (1986).
8
White, supra note _____ at 1672.
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attempts to draw, and transgress, both physical and metaphysical
boundaries.
The dialectic between the tropes of line and unbounded space that
organizes Lawrence’s inaugural paragraph recurs throughout the majority
opinion and forms the basis of Justice Scalia’s dissent—the first paragraph
of which quite self-consciously opens with “liberty” and closes with
“barrier.”9 In this sense, Lawrence dramatizes a conflict between what
Pierre Schlag has called the “grid” and the “energy” aesthetics that “help
shape the creation, apprehension, and even identity of human endeavors,
including, most topically, law.”10 Specifically, Schlag describes the grid
aesthetic as one in which “law is stabilized and objectified into an orderly
field of clearly delineated, neatly bounded, perfectly contiguous legal
conceptions and propositions.”11 A constituent feature of the grid aesthetic
is that of the line – “[w]here do we draw the line?” “[w]ill the line hold” –
which permits judges to “police the boundaries of the grid” and to engage in

9

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Schlag, supra note ____, at 1050. Schlag’s aesthetic taxonomy includes two additional
legal aesthetics that will not be discussed here, the perspectivism and the dissociative
aesthetics. Schlag notes that while all four legal aesthetics conflict—what he calls “the
battle of the aesthetics”—the “most developed, entrenched, and important” battles occur
between the grid versus energy, and the grid and energy versus perspectivism, aesthetics.
Id. at 1104-06.
11
Id. at 1055. Schlag maintains that the advantage or appeal of the grid aesthetic is that it
“promises an enduring and definitive charting of the legal world. Every legal concept has
its own distinct and bounded space, and every place is occupied by a distinct and bounded
legal concept.” Id.
10
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their “border-control jurisprudence.”12

In contrast to the well-defined

linearity and predictability of the grid aesthetic, the energy aesthetic “leaves
the stasis of the grid behind.”13 Under this aesthetic, energy figures as “the
dominant metaphor and image of law. Energy and its manifestations –
‘change,’ ‘transformative change,’ ‘reform,’ ‘progress,’ ‘progressive legal
change,’ – become the ruling motifs. The implicit premise is that the law
and the legal profession are on the move. Law is pictured as an arrow
pointed to the future.”14 Whereas the grid and energy aesthetics can “meld
into hybrids,” they can—and often do—conflict.15
This Article proposes an interpretation of Lawrence v. Texas as a
conflict between the grid and the energy aesthetics—or, to modify Schlag’s
aesthetic taxonomy just slightly, a conflict between the line/boundary and
space/transcendence aesthetics.16 Although a few commentators have
observed that Lawrence realigned liberty’s “boundaries,”17 this Article
offers a novel interpretation of the majority’s opinion as a text that
narratively mimics—through the consistent invocation of images and
metaphors of lines/boundaries and unbounded space—what the Court

12

Id. at 1059.
Id. at 1070.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 1104 (“Whether conducting in the realm of facts or law, these aesthetic conflicts
are negotiated in stylized and highly elaborated (though often arrested) disputes”).
16
The line, of course, is a constitutive feature of Schlag’s grid aesthetic.
17
See, e.g., David D. Meyer, Domesticating Lawrence, 2004 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LEGAL FORUM 453, 454 (stating that “Lawrence is best understood as expanding the
boundaries of the fundamental right of privacy”).
13
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attempts to achieve on a doctrinal level: The transcendence of the line that
Bowersdrew and of the boundaries that morality routinely draws. Indeed,
the line (or grid) aesthetic that characterizes what judges do in the law,
namely, border control jurisprudence, similarly characterizes what
individuals do when making moral judgments, that is, they draw a line
“someplace”

between

acceptable

and

unacceptable

behavior.18

In

repudiating morality as even a legitimate state interest for certain laws,19
however, and emphasizing instead freedom of movement and progress
“beyond spatial bounds” into “more transcendent dimensions,” the
Lawrence majority appears to privilege one aesthetic over another—as
18

See infra Part I, passim.
Whether or not the Lawrence majority repudiated morality as a legitimate or compelling
state interest depends on whether or not the majority subjected the Texas sodomy law at
issue in that case to strict or rational basis scrutiny. This Article does not take a position on
this issue, but rather places more importance on the Court’s explicit dismissal of morality
as a valid basis for law-making. As Nan Hunter has remarked, “[a]lthough it requires some
effort to articulate precisely what standard of review the Court deployed in its analysis,
there is no question that, whatever test it used, the Court eradicated the last vestiges of state
power to criminalize private consensual adult sexual behavior solely on the basis of
morality, without any showing of harm either to persons or to legally protected
institutions.” Nan D. Hunter, Sexual Orientation and the Paradox of Heightened Scrutiny,
102 MICH. L. REV. 1528, 1530 (2004). For critics who have argued that the Court
subjected Texas’ criminal statute to strict scrutiny even though it states that “[t]he Texas
statute furthers no legitimate state interest,” see Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?,
88 MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1158 (2004) (stating that “under my reading, Lawrence is an
application of the old rule that morals justifications for regulation do not count as a state
interest sufficient to trump a fundamental right”); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas:
The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1917
(2004) (stating that “the strictness of the Court’s standard in Lawrence, however
articulated, could hardly have been more obvious”). For an opposing view, see Calvin
Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PENN. J. CONST’L L.
954, 958-59 (2004) (“Despite the Court’s eloquent endorsement of the presumptive liberty
of competent adults voluntarily to enter into personal relationships that involve sexual
intimacy without criminal punishment, the Court did not apply strict scrutiny”).
19
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energy, unmediated space, and transcendence come to replace morality’s
constitutive lines and prescribed boundaries.
At the same time that the Lawrence majority engages these two
aesthetics and appears to supplant one with the other, however, it also
participates in a border control jurisprudence of its own. Not only does the
majority retreat from spatial freedom into bounded space in the opinion’s
closing moments when it emphatically states what its holding is not, but it
also engages in line drawing by setting up a series of binary oppositions
throughout the opinion. Specifically, the majority implicitly as well as
explicitly draws a number of normative distinctions between the criminal
law (sodomy prohibitions) and the civil law (marriage), the private and the
public spheres, and the conduct that should not be subject to majoritarian
moral disapproval and the state-recognized status that might be. The binary
logic that underlies the majority’s opinion suggests that Lawrence’s
repudiation of history—its overruling of Bowers—in search of a new
moment that transcends spatial, temporal, and certain moral limits is
incomplete.
In addition, like the line drawn in Bowers, the lines drawn in
Lawrence are unstable and susceptible to critique. That is, just as Lawrence
found that the line that Bowers drew between normative and non-normative
sexuality did not hold, the line that the Lawrence Court itself draws between

9

private intimate conduct and public marital status does not hold for two
similar and interrelated reasons. First, private conduct remains central to
determining access to the public institution (or status) of marriage. Second,
the “public” institution of marriage has increasingly been viewed as a form
of private20 conduct.21 Conceptualizing marriage in the Lawrence Court’s
terms thus overlooks the extent to which moral disapproval for certain
conduct—namely, the ‘practice’ or ‘conduct’ of same-sex marriage—
continues to deny access to a public institution.

In this sense, then,

Lawrence repeats history. Like Bowers, it draws boundaries, but only by
constructing a line that ultimately cannot hold.
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I will develop the claim
that morality is an act of line-drawing and boundary maintenance in order to
highlight the line aesthetic that the Lawrence Court explicitly rejects when
dismissing morality as a legitimate state interest. Part II will then offer a
close textual interpretation of Lawrence as an incomplete attempt to replace
the line aesthetic with the unbounded space aesthetic that is celebrated in
the opinion’s prefatory remarks and their explicit focus on “liberty” and
“transcendent dimensions.” Section A will argue that Lawrence represents
20

See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott and Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84
VA. L. REV. 1225, 1238 (1998) (stating that “[t]he move toward private ordering of marital
relationships represents a major shift in the law’s stance toward intimate relations”); Jana
B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (“In virtually
all doctrinal areas, private norm creation and private decision making have supplanted
state-imposed rules and structures for governing family-related behavior”).
21
See, e.g., Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 957 (2000).
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the transcendence (or, in negative terms, the dissolution) of boundaries on
several levels, including moral and doctrinal boundaries. Section B will
then show that the majority’s privileging of the space aesthetic over the line
aesthetic is only partial, and that traces of Bowers and its endorsement of
moral line drawing reappear in the form of the binary distinctions—e.g.,
between public and private, criminal and civil, inside and outside—that the
majority sets up throughout the opinion. Part III will finally argue that, not
unlike the line drawn in Bowers, the boundary that separates those binary
oppositions is much less stable and warrants critique. Here, I will draw
from several pre- and post-Lawrence cases that invite us to interrogate the
stability of the distinctions that the majority posits between private conduct
and public status.
I would like to return for a moment to the suggestion made at the
outset of this Introduction that we approach Lawrence as a judicial poem.
To be sure, poems and judicial decisions are different in a number of
significant ways. Most notably, whereas the poem is (or might be) purely
descriptive, the judicial decision is bounded or constrained by normative
commitments.

Notwithstanding such differences,

I suggest that

approaching Lawrence in poetic terms is a useful way to highlight what
takes place in the opinion’s dialectic between line and space, history and the
movement beyond it. Paul de Man has observed that, in contrast to prose,
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“lyric poetry remains the preferred topic of investigation for a definition of
modernity,” which itself is forever in collision “with the demands of a
historical consciousness.”22 Indeed, literary historians have traditionally
approached the poetic form as that which best expresses the desire to
transcend history and the simultaneous realization that complete
transcendence is impossible. De Man in fact conceptualizes the lyric form
as a bringing together of these “two incompatibles, history and
modernity.”23 Similarly, James Boyd White has commented that “[t]he idea
of ‘comprehending contraries,’” that is, “a way of comprising into one thing
elements that seem of necessity to belong apart,” characterizes the poem but
perhaps the judicial opinion even more so, “for the very idea of legal
hearing and of legal argument (of which the judicial opinion is intended to
be a resolution) is that it works by opposition.”24 Of course, as White also
points out, “it is not always possible to include in a coherent structure points
that are diametrically opposed, and something must be left out at last.”25
I propose a reading of Lawrence as just such an attempt to
“comprehend” the “two incompatibles” of history (Bowers) and modernity
(its overruling) that ultimately leaves in—namely, the line-drawing
aesthetic that the majority attempts to repudiate—more than it leaves out.
22

PAUL DE MAN, BLINDNESS AND INSIGHT: ESSAYS IN THE RHETORIC OF CONTEMPORARY
CRITICISM 143 (1971).
23
Id.
24
White, supra note ____, at 1678.
25
Id. at 1679.
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Indeed, more than conventional legal analysis, which focuses on what the
text of an opinion explicitly says—what it holds and how it gets there—an
interpretive strategy that approaches Lawrence in poetic terms and that pays
close attention to the stylistic interplay of competing (and conflicting)
metaphors and tropes, helps to reveal what is implicit in the opinion and
what has otherwise been overlooked by commentators and lower courts
alike.26 Indeed, reading Lawrence as a dialectic or battle between two
aesthetic modes helps to clarify a doctrinal issue that has remained open to
debate—again, for both commentators and lower courts—after that case,
namely, the extent to which the Court intended to banish morality from our
constitutional landscape.27

26

For commentators who have proposed that we might better understand (at least certain)
judicial opinions by subjecting them to a similarly ‘literary’ interpretative strategy, see, for
example, David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment
Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857 (1986). In describing the benefits of this more textured
interpretative approach, Cole remarks that
[b]y suggesting a new method of reading judicial opinions, this article
seeks to highlight and reveal the rhetorical struggles that have always
fueled jurisprudential development. The analysis focuses more than
traditional legal scholarship on the use of linguistic conventions such as
metaphor and tone, and on the internal and intertextual commentary
that these rhetorical elements provide. Rhetorical analysis of a given
text may reveal misreadings that, because of the law’s express
requirement of precedential fidelity, cannot be acknowledged on the
opinion’s surface. Attention to the repetition of particular metaphors
may suggest how these rhetorical elements exert influence over time.
Most importantly, because most of the opinions discussed do not carry
the authority of a majority holding, rhetorical persuasion is their
primary channel of influence.
Id. at 861.
27
See infra note _____ and accompanying text.
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Part I.

Morality and the Line-Drawing Aesthetic

In a figurative sense, at least, morality and immorality meet at the public
scaffold, and it is during this meeting that the line between them is drawn.
Kai Erikson, The Wayward Pilgrim28

In order to understand the moral line-drawing aesthetic that the
Lawrence majority nominally repudiates, it is first necessary to clarify the
relationship
maintenance.

among

morality,

boundary

creation,

and

boundary

The trope or metaphor of the line not only figures

prominently in political and legal discourse over the limits of acceptable
behavior, but also underwrites the very idea of society and its inveterate
need to classify and categorize. Indeed, “[f]or symbols of society, any
human experience of structures, margins or boundaries is ready to hand.”29
George Lakoff, cognitive linguist and author of Moral Politics: How
Liberals and Conservatives Think,30 has demonstrated the extent to which
the moral boundaries metaphor structures the way in which we think about
moral rectitude and deviations from it. In speaking more generally of the
critical role that metaphor plays in organizing human experience, Lakoff

28

KAI ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 12
(1966).
29
MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTS OF
POLLUTION AND TABOO 58 (1966).
30
GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK (2d
ed. 2002).
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argues that “much of moral reasoning is metaphorical reasoning,”31 and that
a conceptual metaphor, like that of moral boundaries, is a conventional way
of “conceptualizing one domain of experience in terms of another, often
unconsciously.”32

While metaphors are common poetic devices,

“metaphorical thought need not be poetic or especially rhetorical. It is
normal, everyday thought.”33

Lakoff explains that morality is

conceptualized in political discourse in terms of a range of metaphors,
including the moral strength, moral essence, moral wholeness, moral purity,
and moral boundaries metaphors.34 Each of these metaphors, he argues, is
used to signify “a set of moral priorities” which he labels the “Strict Father
Morality,” whose model “takes as background the view that life is difficult
and that the world is fundamentally dangerous.”35 Under this model, the
father has “primary responsibility for supporting and protecting the family
as well as the authority to set overall family policy”; the mother “has dayto-day responsibility for the care of the house, raising the children, and
upholding the father’s authority”; and the children “must respect and obey
their parents, partly for their own safety and partly because by doing so they
31

Id. at 5.
Id.
33
Id.; see also GEORGE LAKOFF AND MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 3 (2d ed.
2003) (“metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and
action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is
fundamentally metaphorical in nature”). For a discussion of the role that metaphors play in
legal reasoning that draws heavily from Lakoff and Johnson’s seminal work, see STEVEN L.
WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE AND MIND (2001).
34
LAKOFF, supra note _____, at 65-107, passim.
35
Id. at 65.
32
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build character, that is, self-discipline and self-reliance.”36 While “there are
variants of the model that can be used by a strict [single] mother as well,”
the strict father model “is a cognitively real idealized model, that is, a model
that Americans grow up knowing implicitly.”37
The moral boundaries metaphor is an integral part of this
conventional model of moral priority. Indeed, “strict father morality, with
its sharp division between good and evil and its need for the setting of strict
standard of behavior naturally gives priority to the metaphor of moral
boundaries.”38 Under this metaphor, “moral action is seen as bounded
movement, movement in permissible areas and along permissible paths.”39
Lakoff continues:
Given this, immoral action is seen as motion outside of the
permissible range, as straying from a prescribed path or
transgressing prescribed boundaries.
To characterize
permissible actions is to lay out paths and areas where one
can move freely. To characterize immoral action is to limit
one’s range of movement. In this metaphor, immoral
behavior is “deviant” behavior, a form of metaphorical
motion into unsanctioned areas, along unsanctioned paths,
and toward unsanctioned destinations.40

36
37
38
39
40

Id. at 66.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 84.
Id.
Id.
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Individuals who deviate from the “tried and true path arouse
enormous anger” and “are seen as threats to the community.”41
Consequently, “[f]or the protection of the community, they need to be
isolated and are made outcasts.”42

Lakoff’s description of the moral

boundaries metaphor here coincides with Kai Erikson’s well-known
account of the relationship among deviation, expulsion, and the institution
of moral boundaries. Erikson explains that “[a] human community can be
said to maintain boundaries . . . in the sense that its members tend to confine
themselves to a particular radius of activity and to regard any conduct
which drifts outside that radius as somehow inappropriate or immoral.”43
While the deviant challenges boundaries by “ventur[ing] out to the edges of
the group,”44 she also allows the group or community to throw those same
edges into focus, for “[e]ach time the community moves to censure some
act of deviation . . . and convenes a formal ceremony to deal with the
responsible offender, it sharpens the authority of the violated norm and
restates where the boundaries of the group are located.”45
The moral boundaries metaphor is an integral part of political
discourse and legal rhetoric. To be sure, one need not delve deeply into
either the news media or legal reporters to find that metaphors of line
41
42
43
44
45

Id. at 85.
Id.
ERIKSON, supra note _____, at 15.
Id.
Id. at 13.
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drawing and boundary maintenance provide an organizational framework
for public debate over any number of political and legal controversies. Pat
Anderson, the Florida attorney who represented Terri Schiavo’s parents in
supporting “Terri’s Law,” publicly opined: “Where do we draw the line?
Terri has shown us by her indomitable will to live for the last 14 and a half
years, surviving crisis after crisis, that she wants to live.”46 Similarly,
speaking before the United States Senate Judiciary Committee last year
during a hearing on the necessity for a federal marriage amendment, Senator
Orrin Hatch, in support of that amendment, declared that “I do draw the line
when it comes to traditional marriage. Although I do not believe that it’s
fair to discriminate against anybody in our society, I do think that line needs
to be drawn.”47 To be sure, the debate over marriage between same-sex
partners has generated a wide range of line and boundary metaphors, from
the now proverbial slippery slope metaphor—first same-sex marriage, then
incest48—to the question of how to maintain “the clearest boundary lines of
our federalism,”49 to the issue of how to ‘hold the line’ between religious
morality and the law. During an earlier Senate Judiciary Hearing on samesex marriage, United States Senator Richard Durbin, responding to the

46

Terry Schiavo Case Went to Florida Supreme Court, THE CHRISTIAN POST (Sept. 3,
2004); http: //www.christianpost.com/article/society/959/full/terri.schiavo.case.com.
47
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing (June 22, 2004) (remarks of Senator Orrin Hatch).
48
Interview by the Associated Press with Sen. Rick Santorum (Apr. 7, 2003).
49
Lynn D. Wardle, Williams v. North Carolina, Divorce Recognition and Same Sex
Marriage Recognition, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 187, 213 (1998).
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remarks of one religious leader who underscored the need to “define where
the line really is,” stated that “[s]anctity is your business, Reverend.
Legality is our business. And we better take care to make sure that we keep
that bright line between the two.”50 In reply, the minister merely reaffirmed
what he regarded to be the permeable line between religion and the law:
“[W]hen you get to the talking about the secular and crossing over into the
religious, it was the religious institutions that started marriage way, way
back . . . I’m not sure who crossed the line, but you can’t separate secular
from religious.”51
While the moral boundaries metaphor figures quite prominently in
the way that we talk about morality and the law, it also structures the way
that we think about morality and its role in preserving identity.
Specifically, the line-drawing metaphor speaks to a deep-seated “moral”
need to maintain individual, community, and even national identity
according to a system of well-delineated categories and classifications.
Sociologists Michèle Lamont and Virag Molnar have demonstrated the
extent to which “moral discourse” is used to draw, and maintain, both
symbolic and social boundaries within and between groups.52 According to

50

Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing (Mar. 3, 2004) (remarks of Senator Richard
Durbin).
51
Id. (remarks of Reverend Richard Richardson).
52
Michèle Lamont & Virag Molnar, The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences, 28
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Lamont and Molnar, symbolic boundaries “are conceptual distinctions made
by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and
space. They are tools by which individuals and groups struggle over and
come to agree upon definitions of reality.”53 These boundaries “separate
people into groups and generate feelings of similarity and group
membership;” indeed, “they are an essential medium through which people
acquire status and monopolize resources.”54 Symbolic boundaries, in turn,
become social boundaries when they translate “into identifiable patterns of
social exclusion.”55 An example of this translation would be the tangible
repercussions that employees “who violate gender boundaries, concerning
appropriate norms for time management” might experience in the
workplace.56 In such instances, “symbolic boundaries [are] translated into
social boundaries” when the violation of gender norms produces
“punishment and stigmatization” in the form of withheld promotions or
53

Id. at 171.
Id.
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Id. Lamont and Molnar’s description of symbolic and social boundaries recalls
Erikson’s description of the two senses in which communities are “boundary maintaining.”
Erikson states that
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communities are boundary maintaining: each has a specific territory in
the world as a whole, not only in the sense that it occupies a defined
region of geographical space but also in the sense that it takes over a
particular niche in what might be called cultural space and develops its
own ‘ethos’ or ‘way’ within that compass. Both of these dimensions of
group space, the geographical and the cultural, set the community apart
as a special place and provide an important point of reference for its
members.
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even termination.57 Another example more germane to this Article would
be the prohibition of same-sex marriage, a tangible form of social exclusion
that results from the symbolic classification or categorization of sexuality
into normative and non-normative domains. Lamont and Molnar emphasize
that “symbolic and social boundaries should be viewed as equally real: The
former exist at the intersubjective level whereas the latter manifest
themselves as groupings of individuals.

At the causal level, symbolic

boundaries can be thought of as a necessary but insufficient condition for
the existence of social boundaries.”58
Lamont and Molnar’s concept of boundaries, and their role in
underwriting moral discourse and in generating groupings, categories, and
classifications, resonates with Pierre Schlag’s analysis of the figure of the
line in the law’s grid aesthetic as well as Mary Douglas’ analysis of the
relationship between morality and taboo. The line is a constitutive feature
of Schlag’s grid aesthetic and its chief purpose, namely, the “proper
location and maintenance of boundaries” and the “policing” of borders.59
An inevitable by-product of the grid aesthetic is the multiplication of
classification schemes; Schlag observes that “[t]he proliferation of sundry
classification schemes in the early twentieth century was intense. In fact,
‘classification’ itself became a subject of inquiry, controversy, and of
57
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course, ultimately classification itself.”60 The grid and its classificatory
schemes are “seductive,” in Schlag’s view, because they help to “clean up
the dirt” and to confer order on the “untidiness” that lawyers, as society’s
“’refuse collectors’” and “’janitors,’” know so well.61 Perhaps Schlag here
had in mind Aldous Huxley, who wrote that “tidiness is undeniably good
. . . . The good life can only be lived in a society in which tidiness is
preached

and

practiced.”62

Douglas

similarly

characterizes

these

classifications or “schema” as a form of dirt management and an attempt to
‘tidy up’ the mess around us. She notes, for instance, that “[w]here there is
dirt there is system. Dirt is the by-product of a systematic ordering and
classification of matter.”63 Furthermore, as with Schlag, Douglas identifies
the pivotal role that the line plays in “our pollution behavior, [which] is the
reaction which condemns any object or idea likely to confuse or contradict
cherished classifications.”64

Commenting on the “relation between

pollution and morals,”65 she writes that
[i]t is my belief that people really do think of their own
social environment as consisting of other people joined or
separated by lines which must be protected . . . [W]herever
the lines are precarious we find pollution ideas come to
60
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their support. Physical crossing of the social barrier is
treated as a dangerous pollution. . . . The polluter becomes
a doubly wicked object of reprobation, first because he
crossed the line and second because he endangered
others.66
Douglas’ description of the relationship between lines and pollution
management calls to mind Lakoff’s metaphor of “moral boundaries” and
the stigma—here, “reprobation”—that attaches to the individual who
deviates from the “moral way.” Interestingly, it also calls to mind, as I will
show in a moment, Justice O’Connor’s description in her Lawrence
concurrence of the role that law—and the “moral disapproval” from which
it flows—plays in creating stigma when it draws certain kinds of legal
“classifications” between otherwise “similarly situated” individuals.
While moral boundaries play an important role in regulating a broad
swath of human conduct—work ethic, manners, personal hygiene—they are
critical to a community’s understanding and promotion of sexual morality.
Lamont and Molnar note, for instance, that “sexual boundaries” in
particular “are a fertile terrain for the study of boundary crossing and
boundary shifting as well as the institutionalization and diffusion of
boundaries—precisely because they have become highly contested.”67
They maintain that the contours of moral boundaries in the area of sexual
morality are largely determined by factors such as economic class, gender,
66
67
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geography, and religion – all of which, they observe, are “likely to shape
moral boundaries,” and all of which, it so happens, are shaped by their own
set of oppositional logic.68 I have argued elsewhere that disgust over nontraditional sexual practices and relationships represents a particularly
extreme reaction to boundary violation and a particularly aggressive form of
boundary maintenance.69 Specifically, I have shown that the incest taboo
functions in legal and political rhetoric as a metaphor of line drawing and of
how not to act. An archetypal form of boundary violation, the incest taboo
has been deployed over time to trigger disgust over otherwise consensual
sexual relationships, including those between same-sex and interracial
partners.70 In this sense, I agree with Cass Sunstein’s assertion that the
“incest taboo” functions as a kind of “moral heuristic” in legal and ethical
debates over such seemingly varied issues as cloning and same-sex
marriage.71 Since I have already addressed the relationship between disgust
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Moral heuristics are rules of thumb that give rise to moral judgments. As Sunstein has
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also prone to heuristics. . . .” Cass Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, in BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN
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and boundary maintenance at length, I will not elaborate on it here. Suffice
it to note that disgust, a way of building “moral and social community” and
identity,72 “seems always to be a question of boundaries”73 and of
guaranteeing “demarcation and distance.”74 As Lakoff points out, morality
is “conceptualized as purity and immorality as impurity, as something
disgusting or dirty.”75 The moral purity metaphor thus works together with
the moral boundaries metaphor, for the “morally impure individual must be
isolated and removed from the rest of society so that their [sic] corrupting
effect can be nullified”76 and the “moral health”77 of the community can be
restored.
I would like to conclude here by turning briefly to Justice
O’Connor’s Lawrence concurrence, which highlights the relationship
among morality, law, and the line aesthetic—but which, unlike the majority
opinion, does not embrace unbounded space or transcendence as a counter
aesthetic. Deciding the case on equal protection rather than due process
grounds, Justice O’Connor holds that moral disapproval, like animus,
constitutes an illegitimate state interest for the purpose of equal protection
review. She attacks the legitimacy of Texas’ sodomy law by invoking the
incest taboo itself functions as a moral heuristic insofar as it is used to trigger an intuitive
sense of repugnance against non-traditional sexual practices.
72
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line of equal protection cases, from Moreno through Romer, where the
Court applied a “more searching form of rational basis review” to laws that
impermissibly evince a “bare desire to harm a politically unpopular
group.”78 Indeed, a unifying theme throughout her concurrence is the idea
that legislation based exclusively on moral disapproval, such as the Texas
sodomy law, “brands” or stigmatizes lesbians and gays.

She says, for

instance, that “Texas’ sodomy law brands all homosexuals as criminals,”79
that the law “subjects homosexuals to a ‘lifelong penalty and stigma,’”80
and that “[a] law branding one class of persons as criminal based solely on
the State’s moral disapproval of that class and conduct associated with it
runs contrary to the values of the Constitution and the Equal Protection
Clause,

under

any

standard

of

review.”81

Most interesting, though, are the connections Justice O’Connor
makes between moral disapproval and animus and between moral
disapproval and the line aesthetic. Not only does she suggest that moral
disapproval is tantamount to animus, a doctrinal issue that was left open
after Romer v. Evans,82 but she also underscores the extent to which moral
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disapprobation gives rise to line-drawing in the form of legal classifications.
She continues:
Moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate
governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause
because legal classifications must not be drawn for the
purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.
Texas’ invocation of moral disapproval as a legitimate state
interest proves nothing more than Texas’ desire to
criminalize homosexual sodomy. But the Equal Protection
Clause prevents a State from creating a classification of
persons undertaken for its own sake. And because Texas
so rarely enforces its sodomy law as applied to private,
consensual acts, the law serves more as a statement of
dislike and disapproval against homosexuals than as a tool
to
stop
criminal
behavior.83
By attacking Texas’ sodomy law as a form of line-drawing and legal
classifying that demarcates a pariah class or caste, Justice O’Connor
adheres to the Court’s longstanding “prohibition of class legislation” as one
of “the central tenet[s] of equal protection.”84 Moreover, she speaks to the
critical role that law—Erikson’s “public scaffold”—plays in policing the
animus goes solely to intent, and not to effects,” governmental purposes “ostensibly based
exclusively on moral disapproval, like rationales that reflect hostility, ought never to
withstand equal protection scrutiny, even under the rational basis standard.” Barbara J.
Flagg, “Animus” and Moral Disapproval: A Comment on Romer v. Evans, 82 MINN. L.
REV. 833, 850 (1998). Note, however, that in her concurring opinion Justice O’Connor
states that moral disapproval alone has never constituted a legitimate state interest for equal
protection purposes. 539 U.S. at 581 (“Indeed, we have never held that moral disapproval,
without any other asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection
Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups of persons”). For the question of
whether morality should, and will, drive lawmaking both before and after Lawrence, see
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After
Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233 (2004); Peter M. Cicchino, Reason and the
Rule of Law: Should Bare Assertions of “Public Morality” Qualify as Legitimate
Government Interests for the Purposes of Equal Protection Review?, 87 GEO. L.J. 139
(1998).
83
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“line” between morally permissible and morally impermissible behavior
when it produces “legal classifications” that, in Lamont’s words, create
tangible social boundaries.
While moral disapproval might no longer constitute a legitimate
state interest for rational basis review under Justice O’Connor’s doctrinal
analysis, morality and its constitutive lines and legal classifications are, as I
have shown, an ineradicable part of personal and community identity.
Indeed, moral disapproval and the boundaries it draws are coexistent with
the very idea of community. Erikson explains that when the community
draws a line between morality and immorality and expels those who fall on
the wrong side of the line, “[i]t is declaring how much variability and
diversity can be tolerated within the group before it begins to lose its
distinctive shape, its unique identity.”85 Given the importance of morality
in shaping the contours of community and group identity, it is unlikely that
moral disapproval will no longer drive legislation—notwithstanding the
Supreme Court’s mandate otherwise. As the next Part will demonstrate, the
majority’s incomplete attempt to supplant morality’s line aesthetic with a
new aesthetic, that of liberty’s unbounded space and transcendence, plainly
reveals both the persistence, and the shortcomings, of the law’s linedrawing.
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Part II.

The Counter-Aesthetic: Transcendence

“This side” and “beyond” are faint repetitions of the dialectics of inside and
outside: everything takes form, even infinity. We seek to determine being
and, in so doing, transcend all situations, to give a situation of all situations.
Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space86

Having established the connection between morality and the line
aesthetic, we can now turn to a closer look at the Lawrence majority’s
opinion and the dialectic it stages between line-bounded and unmediated
space. Section A will present a detailed textual reading of the opinion
through its overruling of Bowers and its repudiation of morality as a
legitimate state interest in Part II in order to highlight the transcendence (or
dissolution) of boundaries—physical, doctrinal, and moral—that it entails.
Justice Scalia’s dissent, whose preface explicitly invokes the line/space
dichotomy that later resurfaces in the form of the slippery slope metaphor,
characterizes the Court’s opinion as just such an instance of boundary
dissolution. Section B will then turn to the majority’s reinscription of
boundaries and reliance on the line aesthetic particularly at the end of the
opinion—although to some degree throughout it—when it draws a series of
binary oppositions between inside and outside, personal conduct and staterecognized status, the private and the public realms.
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A.

Transcending Boundaries

The Lawrence majority sets the tone for its opinion in the first
paragraph, where it stages a conflict between line and liberty in words that
have been characterized as “high-flown, and empty”87 and “rhetorically
vacuous” on the one hand, and “elegant,”88 celebratory and “moving” on the
other.89 On the most literal level, liberty acts to bar governmental actors,
presumably absent exigent circumstances, from physically “intrud[ing] into
a dwelling or other private place.”90

Here, liberty protects against

governmental infringements of one’s actual, physical space—the apartment
where John Geddes Lawrence resided. On a more abstract level, however,
liberty acts to constrain the government from imposing its own moral
boundaries—through the operation of the criminal law—on “an autonomy
of self” whose “[f]reedom extends beyond spatial bounds”91 and which is
conceptualized in the first paragraph’s closing sentence in terms of its
“spatial and more transcendent dimensions.”92 Here, liberty protects against
the governmental imposition of boundaries that curb “freedom of thought,
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belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct”93 in the first instance. In
this passage, the majority deploys dialectics of inside/outside and
line/unbounded space in language that will recur throughout its opinion to
describe the extension of both selfhood and due process jurisprudence
“beyond spatial” and doctrinal boundaries, respectively.94
From the grandiloquence of the opening passage the majority moves
next to the comparatively more mundane issue before it, namely, “the
validity of a Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex
to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct.”95 Here, too, the figure of the
line or boundary appears in the form of the threshold that the officers of the
law unjustifiably transgressed in the eyes of the Court, and in the form of
the physical and moral boundary that Lawrence and Garner unjustifiably
transgressed in the eyes of Texas’ lawmakers. The Court notes that officers
from the Harris County Police Department “entered” Lawrence’s apartment
“in response to a reported weapons disturbance” and that “[t]he right of the
93
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police to enter does not seem to have been questioned.”96 Under Texas’
same-sex sodomy law, however, Lawrence and his companion also violated
limits—literal and metaphorical limits, alike. First, the men physically
transgressed corporeal limits by engaging in “deviate sexual intercourse,
namely anal sex, with a member of the same sex (man).”97 Second, the men
figuratively transgressed the state’s moral limits by violating the sodomy
law specifically and normative sexuality—that is, heterosexual sex that does
not involve “any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and
the mouth or anus of another person” or “the penetration of the genitals or
the anus of another person with an object”98—more generally. Physical and
moral boundaries thus here converge—the former a symbol of, and
analogue for, the latter. As Douglas explains, the “symbolism of the body’s
boundaries is used . . . to express danger to community boundaries.”99 She
maintains that this sort of “ritual protection of bodily orifices is treated as a
symbol of social preoccupations about exits and entrances.”100 In engaging
in “deviate” penetrative sex, then, Lawrence and Garner threatened the
integrity of not only of the physical body but its social counterpart—
namely, the community—as well.

However, in finding that the Harris

County Police Department also violated a boundary by intruding “into a
96
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dwelling” and subjecting those who engage in “certain intimate conduct” to
criminal penalties, the Court places constitutional (substantive due process)
constraints around, and thereby sets its own limit to, the community’s
“preoccupations about exits and entrances.” In this sense, liberty is both
expansive—extending

centrifugally

out

into

“more

transcendent

dimensions”—and restrictive, insofar as it constrains the authority of the
government to place limits or boundaries around “an autonomy of self.”
The idea that liberty functions as a boundary that demarcates the
point beyond which the state may not intrude on certain private domains
presents an interesting parallel to the theory, set forth in Part I of this
Article, that morality operates as a boundary that demarcates the point
beyond which an individual may not deviate without incurring the
community’s stigma. Whereas we typically conceptualize liberty—and the
unbounded space aesthetic through which it naturally finds expression—as
the absence of boundaries, liberty also, as the Court suggests, engages in a
line-drawing aesthetic of its own. John Stuart Mill, whom the majority no
doubt invokes in the opinion’s first word, similarly conceptualizes liberty in
On Liberty as that which establishes a “limitation . . . of the power of
government over individuals.”101 Indeed, he notes that “[t]he aim . . . of
patriots was to set limits to the power which the ruler should be suffered to
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exercise over the community; and this limitation was what they meant by
liberty.”102 In other words, for Mill, the question of “where to place the
limit”103 is considered out of a concern for the individual with respect to
governmental infringements of her liberty rather than out of a concern for
the community (or state) with respect to the individual’s deviation from
moral norms.
The majority’s denunciation of certain governmental line-drawing,
the transgression of certain intimate spaces, and the constraints on freedom
that both entail continues throughout Part II of its opinion, where it traces
the historical trajectory of the “substantive reach of liberty under the Due
Process Clause”104 from Griswold v. Connecticut105 through Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey106—and, of course,
where it overrules Bowers v. Hardwick107 in the process. Here, the Court
structures the historical movement of its substantive due process line of
cases in a way that mimics the movement of freedom itself “beyond” spatial
boundaries and into “more transcendent dimensions.” In fact, the Court
uses the same language of ‘extending beyond’ to describe the expansion of
doctrinal boundaries that it used in the opinion’s first passage to describe
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the process by which freedom or liberty “extends beyond” certain
governmental attempts to constrain it.
The majority cites Griswold as “the most pertinent beginning point”
in charting the “substantive reach of liberty under the Due Process Clause.”
In Griswold, of course, the Court found that Connecticut’s birth control law
violated a protective “zone” of marital privacy “created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees”108 explicitly set forth in the Bill of
Rights, including the First, Third, and Fourth Amendments, and applicable
to the states through incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Recognizing that the Court in that case “placed emphasis on the marriage
relation and the protected space of the marital bedroom,”109 the Lawrence
majority begins to chart the centrifugal movement of liberty’s reach. It
notes, for instance, that “the right to make certain decisions regarding
sexual conduct extends beyond the marital relationship,”110 and that
Eisenstadt v. Baird,111 while decided on equal protection grounds,
nevertheless “went on to state the fundamental proposition that the law
impaired the exercise of [an unmarried couple’s] personal rights.”112
Further, as with the “unwarranted intrusion” of the state into a private
dwelling at issue in Lawrence, Eisenstadt similarly found that the individual
108
109
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has a right “to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child.”113 In tracing the expansion of this liberty right from
Griswold to Eisenstadt—and later through Roe v. Wade114 and Carey v.
Population Services International115—the Court embraces the unbounded
space aesthetic that appeared in the opening passage. Just as “freedom [of
self] extends beyond spatial bounds,”116 so, too, has the doctrine protecting
that freedom extended beyond the core protective zone of the marital
relationship.
As the Lawrence majority moves from Griswold and Eisenstadt to
Roe and Carey, liberty’s substantive ‘reaching’ or ‘extending beyond’ the
marital bedroom converges with the transcendent reach of doctrine itself.
By time we get to Roe, freedom entails not simply the right to make “certain
decisions regarding sexual conduct” but “the right of a woman to make
certain fundamental decisions affecting her destiny.”117 At this point, the
Court has moved outward into space—an individual’s very “destiny”—in a
way that intimates the “more transcendent dimensions” of liberty that
Lawrence celebrates. In addition, the expanded liberty right once again
moves in sync with expanding doctrine. The majority notes that the Roe
113
114
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Court, in holding that a woman “did have real and substantial protection as
an exercise of her liberty under the Due Process Clause,” drew from a line
of “cases that protect spatial freedom and cases that go well beyond it.”118
The repetition of the adverbial language of “beyond” has become nearly
anaphoric119—only that instead of appearing at the beginning of sentences
in the opinion it closes them in a way that signals the transcendence of
boundaries as well as the privileging of spatial freedom and the doctrine
that both preserves and protects it. In finally considering the position of
Carey on this centrifugal trajectory, the Court observes that “[b]oth
Eisenstadt and Carey, as well as the holding and rationale in Roe,
confirmed that the reasoning of Griswold could not be confined to the
protection of rights of married adults.”120 Here, the “reasoning” supporting
constitutional doctrine is subject to no more confinement than are the
individuals whose destinies that same doctrine controls.
The transcendence of Bowers’ line -drawing aesthetic becomes
complete once the Court, after tracing the trajectory of liberty’s everexpanding scope, overrules its predecessor. While observing the factual
similarities between the cases—just as “[t]he right of the police to enter” in
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Lawrence “does not seem to have been questioned,” so, too, did Bowers
involve “[a] police officer, whose right to enter seems not to have been in
question”121—the Court also underscores the one obvious difference,
namely, that whereas “the Georgia statute prohibited the conduct whether or
not the participants were of the same sex,” the “Texas statute . . . applies
only to participants of the same sex.”122 Turning to the Bowers’ opinion,
the majority criticizes that Court for failing “to appreciate the extent of the
liberty at stake.”123 Specifically, Bowers neglected to take seriously not
only the “far-reaching consequences”124 of the statute at issue in that case,
but also the fact that sodomy statutes (whether they apply to same-sex or
opposite-sex individuals) “seek to control a personal relationship that,
whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty
of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”125

In

commenting more generally on the lines that the law draws (as well as those
that it unjustifiably transgresses), the Court states that
[t]his, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by
the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the
relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a
person or abuse of an institution the law protects. It
suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to
enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes
and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as
121
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persons.126

free

The opinion’s boundary transcendence here culminates in two opposing
liminal images: the moral and legal boundaries that the law draws between
permissible and impermissible sexual relationships on the one hand, and the
physical and metaphysical boundaries that the law impermissibly
transgresses on the other. Because “adults may choose to enter upon”
certain relationships within “the confines of their homes,” the law may not
“enter” those same confines—the Harris County police that unjustifiably
“entered” Lawrence’s apartment—and attempt to control the liberty of the
person (“in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions”) who dwells
therein “absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law
protects.” If Mill was an indirect presence in the opening passage, he
directly figures here in the Court’s appraisal of where governmental linedrawing (or boundaries) should be set, namely, at the point where conduct
causes injury either to others or to “abuse of an institution the law protects.”
In overruling Bowers, the Court quite literally transcends a line—the
“rule” or regula established by its predecessor—and appears to replace “the
act of line-drawing”127 that Bowers represented with the act of “extend[ing]
beyond” that figures throughout the majority’s narrative of transcendence.
When, later in Part II of the opinion, the majority dismisses morality as
126
127

539 U.S. 538, 567 (2003) (emphasis added).
Rubenfeld, supra note _____, at 747.
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even a legitimate state interest for certain laws, it continues to signal the
repudiation of morality’s line-drawing aesthetic. While recognizing that
individuals possess “deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral
principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the course of their
lives,”128 the Court, quoting Casey, nevertheless declares that “[o]ur
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral
code.”129 Toward the end of the opinion, the majority again dismisses the
role that morality and law play “in circumscribing personal choice”130
when, quoting Justice Stevens’ Bowers dissent, it states that “the fact that
the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice.”131 If, as Part I of this Article contended, morality
is fundamentally an act of line drawing, then the Court here throws those
lines—or at least certain of them—into question.
As noted in the Introduction, the critical response to Lawrence has
been mixed, with some commentators arguing that the Court and its
“vacuous rhetoric” went too far and others that it did not go far enough.
Some critics, like Katherine Franke, contend that the majority, rather than
going to such great lengths, “cabin[ed]” or contained the liberty right that it
128

539 U.S. at 571.
Id.
130
Id. at 576.
131
Id. at 577-78 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
129
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celebrates by mooring it to a conservative, normative vision of sexuality,
one that “both echoes and reinforces a pull toward domesticity in current
gay and lesbian organizing.”132 In the next Section, I will return to this
claim that Lawrence in effect “cabins” or circumscribes the scope—or
height—of its transcendence by reinscribing certain boundaries in the
process of overcoming others.
Unlike Franke, other commentators contend that the Lawrence Court
went too far in transcending prior doctrine as well as American law. For
instance, Professors Lund and McGinnis characterize Lawrence by
adverting—quite appropriately for the purpose of this Article—to a poem,
namely, Prometheus Bound, which they use to thematically organize their
critique of what in their view represents an irresponsible act of “judicial
improvisation”133 and judicial “hubris.”134 Like Aeschylus’135 eponymous
hero, Lawrence charts an “ascent into more transcendent dimensions”136
that reveals a Court “freed from the chains even of rational argument”137
and unmoored from the “promise of Glucksberg,”138 where the Court was
“inclin[ed] to go and sin no more” by limiting fundamental rights to those
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“objectively ‘deeply rooted’ in this Nation’s history and tradition.”139 They
contend that the majority’s flight into “more transcendent dimensions”
signals a deracination of prior doctrine—specifically, Bowers and
Glucksberg and their grounding in “ancient roots”140—and, in light of the
Court’s invocation of foreign precedent, a defiant surpassing of American
law. In a similar vein, other commentators have argued that, along with
Grutter v. Bollinger,141 Lawrence signals the end of the Court’s tripartite
structure of judicial review. As one critic solemnly remarked in the wake of
Lawrence, “[t]he venerable institution of tiered scrutiny is threatened with
collapse.”142
Not surprisingly, the sharpest criticism of the majority’s reputedly
boundless flight of fancy comes from Justice Scalia, whose dissent selfconsciously invokes the line/space dialectic that organizes the majority’s
opinion. As mentioned above, the first paragraph of Justice Scalia’s dissent
draws from the first paragraph of the majority opinion, where liberty and
139

Id.
See, e.g., 478 U.S. at 2844 (“Proscriptions against [homosexual conduct] have ancient
roots”); id. at 2845 (“to claim that [a right to homosexual sodomy] is ‘deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ is, at best,
facetious”); id. at 2846 (“The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy
when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the
language or design of the Constitution”); id. at 2847 (“Decisions of individuals relating to
homosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout the history of
Western civilization. Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian
moral and ethical standards”).
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123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
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line conflict.

Quite unlike the transcendent sweep of liberty in the

majority’s prefatory remarks, however, liberty here undermines “[t]he need
for stability and certainty,” neither of which present a “barrier” or boundary
to the majority’s free-wheeling constitutional jurisprudence, and, in Justice
Scalia’s view, “17-year crusade to overrule Bowers v. Hardwick.”143
Echoing the majority’s declaration that the “penalties and purposes [of
sodomy statutes] have . . . far-reaching consequences,” Justice Scalia
forewarns that the majority’s “unheard-of form of rational-basis review . . .
will have far-reaching implications beyond this case”144—thus capturing the
majority’s language of expansion and transcendence (“far-reaching,”
“beyond”) and highlighting instead their deleterious effects. He notes, in
apocalyptic overtones, that the overruling of Bowers in such an unprincipled
fashion involves not only “a massive disruption of the current social
order”145 but the very “dismantl[ing] [of] the structure of constitutional
law.”146 On this view, the majority’s aesthetic of unbounded space and
transcendence has not only replaced morality’s line-drawing aesthetic but
eradicated it entirely, in effect “la[ying] waste [to] the foundations of our
rational-basis jurisprudence,”147 throwing into question the legitimacy of all
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539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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“traditional ‘morals’ offenses,”148 and initiating an ineluctable fall down the
slippery slope—which, of course, visually evokes the image of the line (or
the lack thereof) and which appears in Justice Scalia’s dissent no less than
three times.149

Indeed, in Justice Scalia’s estimation, the majority’s

abolition of morality (and its line aesthetic) as a valid basis for lawmaking
will send the country straightaway down a gradient into such horribles as
“adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity.” If, as Lund and McGinnis suggest,
Lawrence violates Glucksberg’s and Bowers’ promise that the Court will
“go and sin no more,”150 then Justice Scalia’s warning of the ‘fall’ that will
surely occur in a post-Lawrence world merely completes this biblical
narrative of transgression and its aftermath.
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Id.
See, e.g., 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“State laws against bigamy,
same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality,
and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers’ validation of laws based on
moral choices. Every single one of these laws is called into question by today’s decision”);
id. at 599 (“The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of its citizens that
certain forms of sexual behavior are ‘immoral and unacceptable,’ Bowers, supra, at 196—
the same interest furthered by criminal laws against fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult
incest, bestiality, and obscenity . . . If, as the Court asserts, the promotion of majoritarian
sexual morality is not even a legitimate state interest, none of the above-mentioned laws
can survive rational-basis review”): id. at 600 (“[Rational-basis] review is readily satisfied
here by the same rational basis that satisfied it in Bowers—society’s belief that certain
forms of sexual behavior are ‘immoral and unacceptable,’ 478 U.S. at 196. This is the
same justification that supports many other laws. . . for example, laws against adultery,
fornication, and adult incest, and laws refusing to recognize homosexual marriage”).
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B.

Re-embracing the Boundary Trope

Justice Scalia’s portentous invocation of the slippery slope and of
Lawrence’s slide down it is unwarranted given the extent to which the
majority engages in its own act of line-drawing that would obviate such a
precipitous plunge. If the anaphoric “going beyond” largely structured the
majority’s narrative of transcendence, then the similarly repetitive
appearance of the key qualifier “certain” signals its containment. In its
opening paragraph, the majority limits the reach of transcendence when
noting that “[l]iberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes . . . certain
intimate conduct.”151

The adjectival qualification of liberty’s sweep

reappears in the next paragraph, when the Court again characterizes the
right at issue as a right “to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct,”152 as
well as in the succeeding paragraphs, when the Court charts liberty’s
doctrinal trajectory from the “marital bedroom” to “decisions affecting [a
woman’s] destiny.” Just as Griswold merely “established that the right to
make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct extends beyond the marital
relationship,”153 Roe merely “recognized the right of a woman to make
certain fundamental decisions affecting her destiny.”154

Indeed, the

circumscription of liberty’s scope that is accomplished through the self151
152
153
154

539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (emphasis added).
539 U.S. at 562 (emphasis added).
Id. at 563 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
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conscious insertion of “certain” is paralleled in a remarkable way in the
opinion’s closing sentences. There, in commenting on the myopia that
inevitably limits the writers of any text—including, of course, “those who
drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the
Fourteenth Amendment”—the Court notes that had the drafters “known the
components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been
more specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They knew that
times can blind us to certain truths . . . .”155 Here, the “truth” of liberty’s
“manifold possibilities” is restricted no less than the reach of liberty itself.
Whereas the Lawrence Court criticizes Bowersfor reducing the issue in that
case as “simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct,”156 it
somehow cannot escape that same act of qualification.
The rhetorical qualification of liberty’s expansive scope is matched
by the limits that the Court places around this “liberty of the person both in
its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.” Throughout the opinion,
although particularly toward its conclusion, the majority sets up an
opposition between private conduct and public status that rests on a binary
logic similar to Bowers’ own “act of line drawing”157 between normative
and non-normative sexuality.

For instance, while the Court initially

suggests that as a general matter an individual’s “[f]reedom extends beyond
155
156
157

Id. at 578-79 (emphasis added).
Id. at 567.
Rubenfeld, supra note ____, at 747.

46

spatial bounds” and that the specific issue in this case “involves liberty of
the person” in its “more transcendent dimensions,” it contains that freedom
or liberty in a “dwelling” or similar “private place[].”158 Although the
opening paragraph makes grand gestures toward these definitionally
ambiguous “transcendent dimensions,” Part I of the opinion, which
immediately follows, interiorizes those dimensions by bringing us into
Lawrence’s “private residence.” As noted above, the Court continues to
interiorize the scope of liberty when declaring that the state may not set
“boundaries” around “the relationship” that adults choose “to enter upon . . .
in the confines of their homes and their own private lives.”159 Whereas the
reach of liberty cannot be “confined” to the protection of only “certain”
(i.e., heterosexual marital) relationships—recall the Court’s statement that
“the reasoning of Griswold could not be confined to the protection of rights
of married adults”160—it may be confined to “certain” places, namely, the
private domain.
Katherine Franke has observed that, in contrast to the Court’s
opinion in Casey, which Justice Kennedy co-authored and where “liberty is
likened to a thick form of autonomy,”161 in his Lawrence opinion Justice
Kennedy cabins liberty “through its geographization” and privatization.

158
159
160
161

539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
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Id. at 566.
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Specifically, she notes that the Lawrence majority “relies on a narrow
version of liberty that is both geographized and domesticated—not a robust
conception of sexual freedom or liberty, as is commonly assumed.” In her
view, the liberty interest that the Lawrence majority protects, far from
exploding

out

into

“transcendent

dimensions,”

remains

distinctly

“domestinormative,” that is, tethered to “forms of social membership and,
indeed, citizenship that are structurally identified with domesticated
heterosexual marriage and intimacy.”162

I agree with Franke that the

majority interiorizes or “geographizes” liberty for same-sex partners in a
way that at least nominally grounds it to a doctrinally pre-existent
heteronormative paradigm whose “most pertinent beginning point” is
Griswold. Nevertheless, far from bringing same-sex intimacy within the
same ambit as “domesticated heterosexual marriage and intimacy,” the
Court draws a rather clear boundary between private (same-sex) conduct
and public status—one that removes the liberty interest for same-sex
intimacy from the public domain of marriage. As the Court made clear,
while the state may not cross certain boundaries—the “confines” of one’s
private space—it may set its own “boundaries” in order to preserve an
“institution the law protects.”

162

Id.
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The boundary that the Court draws between private conduct and
public status is most evident in the opinion’s final lines.

Here, after

ostensibly moving beyond the “confines” of prior doctrine and “certain”
intimate spaces, the Court contracts into confined space when it declares
what its holding is not, namely, that “[t]he present case does not involve
minors . . . [i]t does not involve public conduct or prostitution. . . [and] [i]t
does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to
any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”163 If the majority
at least nominally privileged the unbounded space or transcendence
aesthetic throughout its opinion thus far, it here reinstates morality’s (and
Bowers’ ) line aesthetic by marking a boundary between “the personal and
private life of the individual,”164 into which the government “may not
enter,” and formal public recognition of “any relationship that homosexual
persons seek to enter.”165 While morality might no longer constitute a
legitimate state interest for criminalizing certain relationships that occur in
private—as the Court earlier stated, “[t]he issue [here] is whether the
majority may use the power of the State to enforce [ethical and moral
principles] on the whole society through operation of the criminal law”166—
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the Court in these closing passages no doubt preserves the moral boundaries
that separate the private and the public spheres.
In the next Part, I will show that the boundary that the Lawrence
Court draws between private conduct and public status cannot hold any
more than the line that Bowers drew between normative and non-normative
sexuality.

Here, though, I would like to return for a moment to my

suggestion that we approach Lawrence in poetic terms. As I noted earlier,
part of the reason it is useful to think about Lawrence in such terms is the
extent to which the case represents a dialectical struggle peculiar to the lyric
form—a struggle, that is, between “two incompatibles, history and
modernity,”167 and the aesthetics of line and unbounded space, respectively,
that each “incompatible” exemplifies. If the lyric form is the preferred
literary mode for expressing the inescapability of a prior moment that the
poet strives to overcome, then Lawrence’s confrontation with a prior
constitutional

moment—Bowers

v.

Hardwick—and

incomplete

transcendence of that moment might be viewed as its juridical equivalent.
In addition to the Bowers- like line-drawing that the Court
undertakes, Lawrence as a narrative is marked by halting and interrupted
progress toward a new moment in time. While Part II of the opinion is
arranged diachronically, starting with Griswold as “the most pertinent

167
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beginning point” and tracing a doctrinal trajectory through Romer v. Evans,
it is also characterized by repetition. For instance, after “beginning” with
Griswold and moving through Carey, the Court effectively ‘begins again’
when it reaches Bowers, noting how the Court in that case “began its
substantive discussion” by framing the liberty right in unduly narrow
terms.168 Just a few paragraphs later, the Lawrence Court begins anew
when it attacks the “historical premises relied upon by the majority and
concurring opinions in Bowers,” first remarking that “[a]t the outset it
should be noted that there is no long-standing history in this country of laws
directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter” and then moving back
to yet another “[b]eginning” moment in “colonial times.”169 The diachronic
trajectory through time is therefore repeatedly punctured—and thus
interrupted—by moments back in time.

While moving through, and

pressing to transcend, history to claim a new moment in time, the Court is
nevertheless pulled back by history’s strong gravitational force. In this
sense, then, Lawrence re-enacts on a narrative level the struggle between
“two incompatibles, history and modernity,” as well as the limits of
complete transcendence.
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Part III.

The Unstable Boundary

Just as Bowersdrew an unstable —and ultimately unconstitutional—
boundary between normative and non-normative sexuality, Lawrence also
draws a line between private conduct and public status that is unstable and
warrants critique. Section A will interrogate the boundary between private
conduct and public status by demonstrating the extent to which private
(same-sex) conduct is still being used after Lawrence, just as it was before
that case, to deny access to the public institution of marriage. Section B
will then interrogate that same boundary by demonstrating the extent to
which marriage itself, unlike the public institution that the Court conceives
it to be, constitutes a form of private conduct.

A.

Private Conduct & Marital Status

Unlike Justice O’Connor, who makes clear in her concurrence that
civil laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex partners could still pass rational
basis review under the Equal Protection Clause even if criminal laws
singling out same-sex sodomy do not, the Lawrence majority never
explicitly refers to the effect its holding might have on same-sex “marriage”
per se. Nevertheless, the majority undoubtedly gives nod to the validity of
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civil laws that limit the institution of marriage to opposite-sex partners two
times in its opinion, once when it avers that the state may set “boundaries”
in order to preserve “an institution the law protects,” and again when it
declares what its holding does not represent, namely, “whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter.” The Lawrence majority thus draws a
line or binary opposition between (certain) same-sex conduct, which lies
beyond the reach of the law, and the “formal recognition” of same-sex
relationships, which falls within its ambit.
Justice Scalia chides the Court for drawing what in his estimation
represents an unprincipled—and ultimately untenable—distinction between
conduct and status, and for thereby eliminating any and all toeholds on the
slippery slope that leads—ineluctably, in his view—toward same-sex
marriage.

At the conclusion of his dissent, he warns that, if moral

disapproval no longer constitutes even a legitimate state interest for
lawmaking, then there no longer exists any “justification . . . for denying the
benefits of marriage to homosexual couples.”170 I would argue, however,
that the line that the majority draws between conduct and status does not
necessarily fail because morality can never constitute a legitimate state
interest,171 but rather because states will continue—and have continued—
170
171
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after Lawrence to deny same-sex couples access to the civil institution of
marriage on account of the ‘non-procreative’ conduct in which those
couples engage. In other words, the boundary that the Court erects between
certain conduct (which after Lawrence can no longer be subject to moral
disapproval) and marital status (which might be) lacks stability in light of
the extent to which courts after Lawrence have continued to advert to the
“[s]tate’s interest in marital procreation” and “procreation by ‘natural’
reproduction”172 in order to justify limiting marriage to opposite-sex
partners.
Peter Cicchino has observed that “[t]he argument from procreation,
that same-sex relationships will bring about the decline of the nation
through underpopulation, no longer seems to be either advanced seriously
by states or taken seriously by courts.”173 Specifically, he has argued that
“[t]he logic of procreation arguments, if applied consistently, would also
prohibit the use of contraception by heterosexuals. Moreover, it may be
observed that population control has become a practical and moral
imperative for most of the world’s societies, including the United States.”174
Cicchino and others have contended that the argument that laws
limiting marriage to opposite-sex partners could be supported by a
legitimate state interest in “natural” procreation was widely accepted by
172
173
174
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courts hearing challenges to such laws from the 1970s into the 1990s.175
For instance, in upholding a state statute limiting marriage to opposite-sex
partners against a due process and equal protection challenge in Baker v.
Nelson,176 the Supreme Court of Minnesota relied on the procreation
rationale, stating that “[t]he institution of marriage as a union of man and
woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children within a
family, is as old as the book of Genesis.”177 Similarly, in upholding an
identical state statute in Singer v. Hara,178 the Washington Court of Appeals
reasoned that “it is apparent that the state’s refusal to grant a license
allowing the appellants to marry one another is not based upon appellants’
status

as

males,

but

rather

. . . upon the state’s recognition that our society as a whole views marriage
as the appropriate and desirable forum for procreation and the rearing of
children. This is true even though married couples are not required to
become parents and even though some couples are incapable of becoming
parents and even though not all couples who produce children are
married.”179 More recently, in Dean v. District of Columbia,180 the D.C.
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Id.; see also Suzanne Goldberg, Marriage Equality in New Jersey?, 233 N.J. LAW 35
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Court of Appeals turned to the procreation justification in support of a
marriage statute that denied that right to same-sex couples against a due
process challenge on the grounds that “in recognizing a fundamental right to
marry, the Court has only contemplated marriages between persons of
opposite sexes—persons who had the possibility of having children with
each other.”181
Critics of the procreationist argument, including Cicchino, have
noted that while it enjoyed some currency among courts from the 1970s
through the early 1990s, when Dean was decided, it has largely been
discredited by courts in the past decade—at least before Lawrence.182
However, a survey of state and federal cases that have arisen after
Lawrence reveals that procreation—or procreative conduct—is once again
ascendant as a justification in support of both civil (marriage) and criminal
laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.
For instance, in Lewis v. Harris,183 decided this past summer, the
Superior Court of New Jersey upheld that state’s statute limiting marriage to
opposite-sex partners largely on the ground that same-sex couples simply
could not engage in sexual conduct that would lead to ‘natural’ procreation.
181
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Specifically, the court there reasoned that marriage plays a pivotal role “in
procreation and in providing the optimal environment for child rearing” and
that “our society considers marriage between a man and a woman to play a
vital role in propagating the species and in providing the ideal environment
for raising children.”184 Indeed, the Lewis court deployed the same binary
logic, and relied on the same line-drawing and boundary creation, that
Lawrence both embraced and rejected, stating that “no one really disputes
that the State is empowered to privilege marriage by restricting access to, or
drawing principled boundaries around it” and that “a core feature of
marriage is its binary, opposite-sex nature.”185

In his dissent, Judge

Collester noted that the weight that the majority gave to the procreation
argument in that case was curious in light of the fact that “the Attorney
General disclaim[ed] the promotion of procreation as a rationale for
prohibiting same-sex marriage.”186 Similarly, in Morrison v. Sadler,187 the
Indiana Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of that state’s Defense
of Marriage Act almost exclusively on the legitimacy of the state’s alleged
interest in “natural procreation,” reasoning that, unlike “assisted
reproduction or adoption,”
procreation by “natural” reproduction may occur without
any thought for the future. The State, first of all, may
184
185
186
187

Id. at *11.
Id. at *15 (Parrillo, J.A.D., concurring) (emphasis added).
Id. at *22 (Collester, J.A.D., dissenting).
821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. App. 2005).

57

legitimately create the institution of opposite-sex marriage,
and all the benefits accruing to it, in order to encourage
male-female couples to procreate within the legitimacy and
stability of a state-sanctioned relationship and to discourage
unplanned, out-of-wedlock births resulting from “casual”
intercourse. . . . The institution of marriage not only
encourages opposite-sex couples to form a relatively stable
environment for the “natural” procreation of children in the
first place, but it also encourages them to stay together and
raise a child or children together if there is a “change in
plans.”188

Although the same-sex couples challenging the constitutionality of
Indiana’s DOMA contended that “it is irrational to justify opposite-sex only
marriage on procreative grounds because there is no requirement that
couples wishing to marry prove their fertility or willingness to procreate,
and furthermore even definitely sterile persons, such as elderly women, are
allowed to marry,”189 the court responded that such “overbreadth
argument[s]” are routinely dismissed under rational basis review, according
to which “[a] legislative classification is not to be condemned merely
because it is not framed with such mathematical nicety as to include all
within the reason of the classification and to exclude all others.”190

188
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turned to the procreation rationale to support not only civil laws that limit marriage to
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Lower courts’ reliance on the private, non-procreative “conduct” of
same-sex couples as a means of denying access to the public institution of
marriage after Lawrence invites us to interrogate the boundary that the
Court in that case drew between (private) conduct and (public) status,
insofar as the former is still being used to uphold the heterosexual basis of
the latter. Indeed, while the Lewis court noted that Lawrence drew a clear
line between laws that make “it a crime for two persons of the same sex to
engage in certain types of intimate conduct” and laws that preserve the
traditional institution of marriage, it nevertheless found that non-procreative
conduct constituted a basis for denying access to the public institution of
marriage, pointing to “the traditional and still prevailing religious and

penalties to gays and straights. Specifically, in State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229 (Kan. App.
2004), the Kansas Court of Appeals considered the constitutionality of that state’s Romeo
and Juliet Law, which explicitly discriminates between heterosexual and same-sex
sodomy between adults and children by imposing penalties on the latter in excess of 14
times those imposed on the former. In that case, the defendant, an 18-year old adult
male, was prosecuted under Kansas’ statute for engaging in sodomy with a 14-year old
boy, both of whom where developmentally disabled, and sentenced to 206 months, or 18
years, incarceration. Had the boy been a girl, however, the defendant would have been
sentenced only to 13-15 months. In considering the constitutionality of the statute in
light of Lawrence, the court relied, among other rationales, on the ground that “sexual
acts between same-sex couples do not lead to procreation on their own” and that “the
family is commonly recognized as the unit for the procreation and the rearing of
children.” 83 P.3d at 237. While the Kansas statute thus categorically discourages—and,
indeed, punishes—any sexual relations between adults and minors, it ironically awards
those heterosexual defendants who might impregnate (and legally marry) their victims
with a lesser penalty. As the Limon dissent pointed out, “it is incomprehensible that this
law has anything to do with encouraging marriage and procreation between the victim
and the assailant, or anyone else, as is apparently claimed by the State and approved by
the majority.” Id. at 247 (Pierron, J., dissenting).
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societal view of marriage as a union between a man and a woman that plays
a vital role in propagating the species.”191
What is particularly noteworthy in these cases is the extent to which
natural procreation, as a reason for denying access to marriage, is privileged
even over and above adoption—the primary aim of which has been to
“naturalize” the adopted child into the adoptive family.192 Perhaps most
notable in this regard was the 11th Circuit’s opinion in Lofton v. Secretary of
the Department of Children and Family Services,193 also decided after
Lawrence. There, lesbian and gay foster parents and guardians challenged
the constitutionality of Florida’s adoption statute, which categorically
prohibited lesbians and gays from adopting children. In upholding the
statute against the lesbian and gay plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge, the
court accepted the state’s justification that “the statute is rationally related
to Florida’s interest in furthering the best interests of adopted children by
placing them in families with married mothers and fathers” even though the
statute placed categorical restrictions around sexual orientation, not marital
status.194 When, again just this summer, a lesbian couple that had been
legally married in Massachusetts and then later challenged the
constitutionality of the federal DOMA statute after moving to Florida, the
191

2005 WL 1388578, at *6.
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Federal District Court for the Middle District of Florida in Wilson v. Ake195
upheld DOMA partly on the ground that the United States government had
asserted a legitimate state interest in natural procreation and the biological
family:
First, the government argues that DOMA fosters the
development of relationships that are optimal for
procreation, thereby encouraging the “stable generational
continuity of the United States.” DOMA allegedly furthers
this interest by permitting the states to deny recognition to
same-sex marriages performed elsewhere and by adopting
the traditional definition of marriage for purposes of federal
statutes. Second, DOMA “encourage[s] the creation of
stable relationships that facilitate the rearing of children by
both of their biological parents.” The government argues
that these stable relationships encourage the creation of
stable families that are well suited to nurturing and raising
children. Plaintiffs offer little to rebut the government’s
argument that DOMA is rationally related to the
government’s
proffered
legitimate
interests.196
In Florida, then, same-sex partners are placed in an ironic double-bind:
They may not adopt children because they cannot marry, and they may not
marry because they cannot have children through what courts deem to be
“natural,” biological reproductive conduct.

Whereas the Lofton court

placed considerable emphasis on the fact that same-sex couples could not
adopt because of their failure to “reproduce” the marital family unit, the Ake
court, in explicitly privileging the “rearing of children by both of their
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354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
Id. at 1309 (internal citations omitted).
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biological parents,” appeared to discount the legitimacy of even the
adoptive family unit.
While after Lawrence the government may no longer subject those
who engage in same-sex conduct to criminal sanctions, it may, as these
cases suggest, continue to rely on the non-procreative nature of that same
conduct to deny same-sex couples access to the public institution of
marriage. For this reason, the line or boundary that the Lawrence majority
draws between conduct and status, and the role that morality might play in
regulating each, is far less stable and far more permeable than the Court
likely conceives it to be. Indeed, lower state and federal courts’ reliance on
the procreation rationale after Lawrence is curious in light of the fact that
the majority situates the issue in that case—the right to engage in same-sex
conduct without facing criminal penalties—within a larger narrative about
the right not to procreate, one that ‘begins’ with Griswold and continues
through Roe and Casey. In Bowers, the Court refused to place same -sex
conduct within the larger context of this same doctrinal narrative, stating
that “[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one
hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated, either by
the Court of Appeals or by respondent.” Whereas Lawrence appears to
depart from its predecessor by placing same-sex conduct on this doctrinal
trajectory and by thereby suggesting a positive “connection” between
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“marriage” and “homosexual activity,” it, too, attempts to sever this
connection by drawing a clear line between status and conduct—a line
whose stability has already been thrown into question by lower court rulings
that advert to the latter (conduct) in order to deny same-sex couples the
former (status).

B.

Marital Status as Private Conduct

The line that Lawrence draws between private conduct and public
status is problematic not only because of the extent to which such (nonprocreative) conduct continues to figure in the denial of marital status, but
also because of the extent to which the public status of marriage itself might
be viewed as a form of conduct in general and private conduct in particular.
Indeed, family law scholars have revealed the extent to which marriage has
been “privatized” and subject to “private ordering” through the increased
tendency of actors to rely on contract to order marital relations at both their
inception and their dissolution.

Beyond this, though, we might view

marriage as private conduct—as opposed to public status—not only because
it constitutes a form of “expressive conduct” that warrants First Amendment
protection, but also because the law itself has viewed marriage in such
conduct-based terms in both the criminal and the civil law contexts.
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Jana Singer has thoroughly demonstrated the degree to which
“family law has become increasingly privatized.”197 As she comments,
“[i]n virtually all doctrinal areas, private norm creation and private decision
making have supplanted state-imposed rules and structures for governing
family-related behavior.”198 For instance, she remarks that whereas the law
traditionally “underscored the public nature of marriage by defining for all
participants the salient aspects of the marriage bond, particularly the legal
and economic relationship between spouses,”199 over the past three decades
state-control over the marital relationship has eroded in three interrelated
ways:
First, the state-imposed marriage contract is a far less
comprehensive or precise instrument than it was a
generation or two ago. In particular, the reciprocal rights
and obligations of spouses are both less well-defined and
less extensive than they were in previous generations.
Second, individual coupes today have considerably more
freedom than in the past to vary by private agreement what
little remains of the state-imposed marriage contract.
Third, the law increasingly treats marriage partners as
individuals, rather than as a single merged unit, for
purposes
of
doctrinal
analysis.200
Similarly, as with the law surrounding marriage at its inception, the
law covering divorce has experienced a shift away from state control and
toward private ordering through both the creation of no-fault divorce and
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the ceding of state management over the financial incidents of divorce to
private actors. Indeed, “[w]ith the adoption of no-fault divorce, and the
accompanying demise of the state-imposed marriage contract, the
legitimacy of the state’s role in structuring a couple’s post divorce
economic

and

parenting

relationship

has

become

increasingly

problematic.”201
Other commentators have noted the extent to which the law
governing marriage has been subject to “private ordering”202 that has
notably transformed what was previously a public institution or ‘status’
over which the state exercised “paternalistic control,”203 to a predominantly
private contractual arrangement between those actors most intimately
involved.

As Elizabeth Scott and Robert Scott have argued, “[n]o

exhaustive survey of legal developments is required to demonstrate the
pervasiveness of the trend from state control to private ordering within
marriage. Currently, there are few state-prescribed obligations associated
with marriage, and fewer still that cannot be altered by the parties.”204 The
extent to which state power over the marital relationship—again, whether at
its inception or at its dissolution—has been ceded to private parties should
force us to reexamine, and interrogate, the boundary that the Lawrence
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majority draws between private (same-sex) conduct and public (marital)
status.
When the majority writes that the law may not draw boundaries
around certain private relationships although it may do so in order to
preserve “an institution that the law protects”; and when it emphasizes that
its holding is limited to private rather than “public” conduct and does not
extend to “formal recognition [of] any relationship that homosexual persons
seek to enter,” it underestimates the largely private and customizable
character of that nominally “public” institution.

Considering the

privatization of marriage that has taken place over the last three decades, the
Court’s insistence on maintaining the ‘line’ between private conduct and
public status—and on using marriage as an example of the latter—is
arguably no less arbitrary, and surely no more stable, than the line that
Bowers drew between those sexual choices (and relationships) that receive
robust constitutional protection and those that do not.
The line that Lawrence draws between private (same-sex) conduct
and public (marital) status is unstable not only because of the increasingly
private regulation of that status, but also because the status of marriage
itself might be viewed as a form of conduct. Specifically, the Lawrence
majority’s conceptualization of marriage as a formalistic, institutionalized,
and status-based relationship (“an institution the law protects,” “formal
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recognition to any relationship”) fails to capture the performative,
expressive, and conduct-like aspects of marriage. David Cruz, for instance,
has contended that marriage is an “expressive resource” that, as with myriad
other forms of expression, warrants First Amendment protection.205
Analogizing (same-sex as well as opposite-sex) marriage to a form of
expressive conduct, Cruz argues that
[t]he high expressivity, historical pedigree, and uniqueness
of civil marriage should suffice to place it on the protected
side of the line between “expressive conduct” and conduct
that is “de minimis expressive.” Courts have already
recognized that a number of actions can be engaged in for
expressive purposes sufficient to claim the shelter of the
First Amendment. Marriage, including civil marriage, is at
least as effective for communicating some messages as is
conduct such as making a donation to a political candidate;
beating a drum during an anti-war demonstration also
involving chanting; and allowing two court clerks to attend
a training seminar in violation of their employer-judge’s
instructions that only people who contributed to his
reelection campaign can be allowed to attend. And
although its contours have changed over time, civil
marriage is a longstanding institution traditionally used by
people to express themselves to each other and to society at
large. Moreover, no other institution is very similar to
marriage, and this uniqueness helps leave open the
possibility of distinguishing marrying civilly from other
actions people might try to bring within the scope of
expressive conduct doctrine.206
205

David B. Cruz, “Just Don’t Call it Marriage”: The First Amendment and Marriage as
an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925 (2001); see also id. at 974 (stating that
“civil marriage offers eligible couples far more than just money. It provides a web of legal
entitlements . . . and responsibilities, an affiliation with a rich institutional tradition, and a
uniquely potent expressive resource usable to communicate love and commitment to one
another and to the world at large. It is this latter aspect that is crucially important to
marriage as a social practice and that renders civil marriage properly subject to First
Amendment scrutiny”).
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Other

commentators

have

underscored

the

importance

of

“expressive conduct” in defining either marital or marriage-“like”
relationships. For instance, in tracing the demise of common law marriage
during the early twentieth century through the lens of a celebrated New
York trial, Ariela Dubler has shown that, while the law has traditionally
looked upon the performative aspects (or conduct) of common law marriage
with considerable disfavor and distrust,207 the law in some jurisdictions
continues to grant rights to unmarried cohabitants who ‘act’ or ‘conduct
themselves’ like a married couple. Perhaps most noteworthy in this respect
is Braschi v. Stahl Associates,208 where the New York Court of Appeals
found that because two men had “functioned” like a married couple during
their ten-year relationship, one of the men qualified to inherit the other’s
rent-controlled apartment under New York’s rent control statute. In that
case, the conduct of the parties was not under review to determine whether a
marriage existed—as the two men were ineligible to marry under New
York’s opposite-sex marriage requirement—but rather whether they
conducted themselves in the manner of a married couple so as to render the
surviving spouse a beneficiary under the statute. In addition to espousing a
functionalist perspective of the family, then, what Braschi reveals is the
207
208
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68

assumption that underlies the law’s understanding of how a married couple
either does, or arguably should, act, as well as the simple fact that marriage
implies conduct between the parties over and above the nominal status
conferred by the state.
While the conduct elements of marriage might factor into the law’s
approach to determining whether a marriage (or an approximation thereof)
exists in order to confer the rights that flow therefrom upon the parties,
marriage is primarily conceptualized in conduct-based terms when
individuals are either exiting, or being penalized for, it. Three examples in
particular might here be offered to illustrate the private, conduct-based
nature of a relationship that Lawrence largely views in public, status-based
terms.
First, the conduct of the marital relationship is most at issue at the
time of its dissolution, as the law in several states continues to scrutinize the
conduct of the parties during marriage in order to determine the incidents of
divorce, including spousal maintenance, property division, and any child
custody issues should they exist. Second, the criminal law conceives of
marriage as a form of conduct insofar as the parties involved might be
subject to criminal sanctions should they violate any statute that prohibits
marriage between certain individuals—as, for instance, in the case of
criminal incest laws that prohibit marriage between specified family

69

members, or, at one time, of anti-miscegenation statutes that rendered
marriage between whites and certain statutorily-defined “colored persons” a
form of criminal conduct.209 Third, the Department of Defense’s policy of
“don’t ask don’t tell” conceives of marriage in conduct-based terms insofar
as marriage, or an attempted marriage, between same-sex individuals—
either, or both, of whom are military personnel—constitutes a form of
“homosexual conduct” that divulges one’s “homosexual” orientation and
will therefore result in the dismissal of that member or members.210
Perhaps ironically, the military’s policy of dismissing any member who
either marries or attempts to marry an individual of the same sex because
209

For instance, the criminal statute at issue, and held unconstitutional, in Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), provided that
[i]f any white person and colored person shall go out of this State, for
the purpose of being married, and with the intention of returning, and
be married out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it, cohabiting
as man and wife, they shall be punished as provided in s 20-59, and the
marriage shall be governed by the same law as if it had been
solemnized in this State. The fact of their cohabitation here as man and
wife shall be evidence of their marriage.

Id. at 4 (citing CODE VA. 1950, § 20-58). As with the military’s policy of “don’t ask, don’t
tell,” where the act or conduct of marrying reveals a sanctionable sexual orientation status
(see infra note ____ and accompanying text), similarly here the act or conduct of
cohabitation “as man and wife” reveals a criminally sanctionable marital status.
210
10 U.S.C.A. section 654 (commonly referred to as “don’t ask, don’t tell”) provides that
“[a] member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed forces under
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense if” (1) that member engages, or attempts
to engage, in a “homosexual act or acts”; (2) that member states that he or she is “a
homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect, unless there is a further finding, made and
approved in accordance with procedures set forth in the regulations, that the member has
demonstrated that he or she is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a
propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts”; and (3) that member
“has married or attempted to marry a person known to be of the same biological sex.” 10
U.S.C.A. § 654 (2005).
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such conduct would reveal that member’s “homosexual” sexual orientation
strongly supports Cruz’s argument that marriage constitutes an “expressive
resource” or “expressive conduct” that warrants First Amendment
protection. Indeed, if marrying, or attempting to marry, a member of the
same sex did not rise to the level of conduct that expresses a sexual
orientation fundamentally incompatible with the military’s objectives, then
presumably the act or conduct of marrying would have little expressive
value and would not necessarily result in the dismissal of the individual
who married, or attempted to marry, a member of the same sex. “Don’t ask,
don’t tell,” however, not only recognizes the expressive (First Amendment)
value of marriage, but paradoxically reinforces it.
Given the extent to which marriage might be viewed as a form of
private conduct, as well as the extent to which private conduct is still being
used to deny marital status, the line or binary opposition that the Lawrence
majority draws between private (same-sex) conduct and public (marital)
status is subject to the same criticisms—e.g., it is arbitrary, unstable, and
permeable—as is the line that Bowers drew and that the Lawrence Court
transcended—and, of course, redrew. Ironically, in this sense, critics who
have declaimed the majority’s opinion as an exercise in judicial hubris and
as an irresponsible instance of boundary transcendence (or dissolution)
might well be right to point out that the majority drew a line between
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private conduct and public status that logically cannot hold. To be sure,
Justice Scalia himself calls attention to the weaknesses not only of the
boundary that the majority drew but also of the procreation rationale that
lower courts after Lawrence have adverted to in order to maintain that
boundary. He says:
If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is “no
legitimate state interest” for purposes of proscribing that
conduct, ante, at 2484; and if, as the Court coos (casting
aside all pretense of neutrality), “[w]hen sexuality finds
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person,
the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that
is more enduring,” ante, at 2478; what justification could
there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to
homosexual couples exercising “[t]he liberty protected by
the Constitution,” ibid.? Surely not the encouragement of
procreation, since the sterile and the elderly are allowed to
marry.211

As Nan Hunter remarks, “Justice Scalia, whose gifts to gay rights advocates
can include over-reading holdings with which he disagrees, declares that
nothing stands between Lawrence and gay marriage, unless illogical
distinctions
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drawn.”212

Part IV.

Conclusion

When one first reads Lawrence, one is immediately struck by the
effusiveness of some of the majority’s statements. I use this term here,
“effusiveness,” deliberately—as the six sentences in the opening paragraph
almost seem to spill over into each other in a way that one does (or might)
not typically expect to occur in a legal opinion. Reading Lawrence as a
poem that dramatizes a conflict of aesthetic modes is thus to some extent
invited by the Court itself; this Article has accepted that invitation.
Moreover, the poetic effusiveness of these, and other, remarks—including
the statement, quoted above, which Justice Scalia wryly characterizes as
“coo[ing],”213—finds its counterpart, as I have contended, in the ‘effusion’
that occurs on a doctrinal level as the Court surpasses the boundaries not
only of prior case law, but also of morality and the line-drawing aesthetic in
which it naturally finds expression.
At the same time that Lawrence represents a narrative of unbounded
space, transcendence, and effusion, however, it is also represents a narrative
of containment. While the Lawrence majority attempts to transcend the
lines that morality—and its extreme form, disgust—routinely draws as well
213

The statement that “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with
another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring.” 539 U.S. at 567.
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as the line that Bowers drew, it, too, engages in its own act of line drawing
and containment. In this sense, then, Lawrence both resists and relies on a
policy of containment. Indeed, containment, it seems, is an ongoing theme
in both post-Lawrence theory and lower-court jurisprudence. Not only have
lower courts attempted to contain or cabin the scope of the majority’s
holding by drawing lines between conduct and status and the private and the
public spheres, but commentators have also called attention to the impulse
to limit the reach of Lawrence’s holding on the part of policymakers. As
Hunter has remarked, “deprived of criminal law as a tool, opponents of
equality for lesbians and gay men are likely to concentrate increasingly on
the strategy of containment.”214
By approaching Lawrence as a poetic text that ultimately
participates in the same law-drawing aesthetic that on an explicit level it
putatively transcends, I have provided an alternative to the more
conventional readings of that text that have appeared in the legal literature.
214

Hunter, supra note _____, at 1542. She continues:
The effort to contain homosexuality and even an explicit comparison to
communicable disease is not new; even before AIDS, the metaphor of
disease was used to defend sodomy laws. Containment now buttresses
a kinder, gentler hierarchy, but one that courts nonetheless continuously
modernize by refining the rationales for antigay bigotry. Much of the
current debate about homosexuality appears grounded in beliefs in fair
treatment for lesbian and gay Americans that co-exist with beliefs in
the superiority of heterosexuality. In this atmosphere, public policy
disputes are likely to center on the proper degree of containment
necessary for what is perceived to be the homosexual menace to public
culture.

Id.
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In so doing, I have suggested that Lawrence contains on an implicit level
the very same inclination to draw lines that on an explicit level it appears to
reject when finding that morality no longer constitutes even a legitimate
state interest for at least certain kinds of lawmaking. This more textured
literary form of judicial interpretation thus tells us something that a more
conventional form of judicial analysis would likely miss, namely, that
morality and its governing aesthetic remain an integral part of our
constitutional landscape—notwithstanding the Lawrence majority’s explicit
disclaimers to the contrary and as clearly evidenced by lower courts that
have interpreted that case. More than clarifying a vexed doctrinal issue,
however, this poetic interpretation has offered an alterative way to read
opinions that takes seriously the metaphors and tropes that the Court (or, for
that matter, any court) deploys—in short, a reading that accepts the Court’s
suggested invitation to treat the literary language that appears in legal texts
as more than just rhetoric.
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